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企业过度投资行为的动因、证据与治理研究综述
引用本文:孙进军,顾乃康.企业过度投资行为的动因、证据与治理研究综述[J].湖南财经高等专科学校学报,2012,28(2):150-155.
作者姓名:孙进军  顾乃康
作者单位:1. 广东金融学院金融系,广东广州,510521
2. 中山大学管理学院,广东广州,510275
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“现金持有量的决定与价值研究”,中央财政专项资金“金融学省级重点学科建设项目”阶段研究成果之一
摘    要:企业过度投资行为的内部成因包括委托人——代理人的代理冲突、内部人——外部人的信息不对称以及管理层与投资者的非理性行为,外部成因主要体现在投资者保护程度、市场竞争机制、信息披露程度以及金融市场的成熟度等方面。现有研究成果充分考察了我国企业过度投资行为的证据,可通过完善市场竞争机制、加强信息披露、优化管理层激励机制、发挥债务的相机治理作用以及调整管理层的心智模式等渠道有效抑制企业的过度投资行为。

关 键 词:过度投资  代理冲突  信息不对称  非理性行为

Review on the Cause,Evidence and Governance of Corporate Overinvestment
SUN Jin-jun,GU Nai-kang.Review on the Cause,Evidence and Governance of Corporate Overinvestment[J].Journal of Hunan Financial and Economic College,2012,28(2):150-155.
Authors:SUN Jin-jun  GU Nai-kang
Institution:1.Department of Finance,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou Guangdong 510521; 2.School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou Guangdong 510275)
Abstract:The internal causes of corporate overinvestment include agency conflicts between principal and agent,asymmetric information between the insider and outsider and the irrational behavior of manager and investor.The external causes include investor protection degree,market competition mechanism,information disclosure degree and the development level of financial market.The existing research results have investigated the evidence of corporate overinvestment in domestic firms.The ways to restrain corporate overinvestment effectively include perfecting the market competition mechanism,strengthening the degree of information disclosure,optimizing managerial incentive mechanism,affecting the contingent governance function and adjusting the managerial mind models.
Keywords:overinvestment  agency conflict  asymmetric information  irrational behavior
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