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中国基金经理激励机制的现状与发展
引用本文:彭耿.中国基金经理激励机制的现状与发展[J].当代经济管理,2010,32(2):37-40.
作者姓名:彭耿
作者单位:吉首大学,商学院,湖南,吉首,416000
摘    要:基金经理的道德风险是一种潜在的威胁投资者利益的风险,通过法律法规、治理结构以及监管可以约束基金经理,但通过激励机制来激励基金经理努力工作并防范基金经理的道德风险却是最可行的方法。文章对中国基金经理激励机制的现状与发展进行了分析,期望为基金投资者利益的保护,乃至为中国基金业的发展提供一个新的视角。

关 键 词:基金经理  激励机制  持基激励  自购行为

The Status and Development of the Incentive Mechanism of Chinese Fund Managers
Peng Geng.The Status and Development of the Incentive Mechanism of Chinese Fund Managers[J].Contemporary Economic Management,2010,32(2):37-40.
Authors:Peng Geng
Institution:Business School;Jishou University;Jishou 416000;China
Abstract:The moral hazard of fund managers is a potential threat against the interests of investors and fund managers can be bound by laws and regulations,governance structure and supervision.But through the incentive mechanism encouraging fund managers to work hard and to guard against the moral hazard of fund managers is the most feasible method.In this paper,the current situation and development of the incentive mechanism of Chinese fund managers is analyzed,which aims to protect the interests of fund investors,a...
Keywords:fund managers  incentive mechanism  holding fund incentive  self-purchase behavior  
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