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上市公司过度投资动因研究——基于经理报酬视角的分析
引用本文:蔡吉甫.上市公司过度投资动因研究——基于经理报酬视角的分析[J].河北经贸大学学报,2009,30(5).
作者姓名:蔡吉甫
作者单位:江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌,330013
基金项目:江西财经大学"公司治理与会计治理"校级创新团队阶段性研究成果 
摘    要:当公司存在自由现金流量时,中国上市公司倾向于过度投资,不过自由现金流量与过度投资的关系会因公司的成长机会高低和持有的自由现金流量的多少而有所不同,从而表现出一定的区间效应。其中,代理问题最严重的高自由现金流量、低成长机会的公司过度投资倾向明显大于其他类型的公司。从对公司过度投资的动因检验来看,高自由现金流量的公司的过度投资与经理报酬显著正相关,显示出此类公司过度投资的动机很大程度上在于提高经理报酬,因而表现出很强的机会主义行为。

关 键 词:自由现金流量  过度投资  经理报酬  动因

Motives of Overinvestment by Listed Companies
Cai Jifu.Motives of Overinvestment by Listed Companies[J].Journal Of Hebei University Of Economics and Trade,2009,30(5).
Authors:Cai Jifu
Abstract:When there are free cash flow in companies,China's listed companies tend to overinvest.But the relationship between free cash flow and overinvestment is affected by the growth opportunities and the amount of free cash flow.The companies with serious proxy problems,high free cash flow and small growth opportunities are more likely to overinvest than other companies.The examination of the motives of overinvestment shows that the companies with high free cash flow is positively related to the executive compens...
Keywords:free cash flow  overinvestment  executive compensation  motive  
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