解释我国国有企业公司化改制绩效欠佳的另一视角——委托人机会主义行为

国外传统的国有企业经过公司化的重组改制后,效益普遍得到提高,经营状况也得到明显改善,而我国国有企业的公司化改制既未能建立起现代公司法人治理结构,也未能使国有企业的运行状况得到明显好转,某种意义上可以说,我国国有企业的公司化改制是无效的,本文试图对此给出一个合理的解释。由于信息不对称及委托人和代理人目标函数的不一致,不仅代理人存在机会主义动机,委托人同样也存在机会主义动机,只有加重惩罚委托人的机会主义行为,委托人才有激励付出成本努力设计包括现代法人公司治理结构的各种克服委托-代理问题的制度安排,从而国有企业的经营状况和效益才可能改观,由于我国缺乏对国有企业委托人机会主义行为的惩罚机制,公司化改制也就不可能从根本上改变国有企业的运行机制,也就很难改善国有企业的经营状况和效益,从而表现为公司化改制的无效。

New Perspective of Explaining the Unsatisfactory Result of the Corporation Reformation of SOEs

While incorporation reformation has enabled the foreign traditional state-owned enterprises to improve their economic benefits and better their operations it has not helped China's SOEs to build corporate governance nor has it substantially improved their operations.Thus it is all right to say that the corporation reformation of SOEs in China is ineffective.This paper attempts to provide a rational explanation for this phenomenon.The asymmetric information and the different target function between the principal and agent has resulted in the opportunistic behaviors not only on the part of agents but also on principals.Only the severe punishment of the principal's opportunistic behaviors can force the principal to make efforts to institute various system arrangement,such as corporate governance,to overcome the principal-agent problems so that SOE's operations and benefits can be improved.So far in China,there is no punishment mechanism for the principal's opportunistic behaviors so the operation mechanism of SOEs has not been fundamentally changed.Therefore,the reformation is ineffective for it has failed to improve SOE's operation and benefits.