国有企业经营者的选任、激励和监督机制

国有企业改革是中国经济体制改革的中心环节 ,而国有企业经营者的选任、激励和监督机制则是关系国企改革成败的关键问题。本文以经济学的委托———代理理论为基础 ,以秦皇岛市 2 0家 60名大中型企业负责人的问卷调查为佐证 ,通过对转型期国有企业经营者的行为特征分析 ,针对国企经营者管理中存在的行政化选任模式激励无效和监督失灵等问题 ,系统提出了解决问题的基本方向和实施意见 ,即变国企负责人的委任制为从职业经营者中的聘任制 ;以年薪制和股权制为主要手段 ,建立有效可行的激励机制 ;以外部稽查、审计和内部制衡及民主管理为主要措施 ,构筑完善有力的监督机制

Mechanism of appointment,incentive and supervision of state owned enterprises'managers

The reform of state owned enterprise is the central link of the restructuring of economic system of China and the mechanism of appointment,incentive and supervision of state owned enterprises’ managers is the key problem concerning the success and failure of state ownes enterprise reform.Based on principal agent theory of economics,taking the questionnaire investigation of 60 persons in charge of large and middle enterprises in QinHuangDao city as evidence,aimed at the problems of administrative pattern in appointment,non effective incentive and supervision failure existing in the administration of state owned enterprises’managers,this paper systematically puts forward the basic direction and enforcement suggestions to solve the probnlems:substituting appointment of state owned enterprises’managers for engagement from professional managers;building effective and practicable incentive mechanism by taking the systems of yearly salary and stock option as main means;constructing perfect and powerful supervision mechanism by taking external check and audit as well as internal restriction and democratic management as main measures.