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激励约束机制设计与上市公司合谋的灰关联度分析
引用本文:闫邹先.激励约束机制设计与上市公司合谋的灰关联度分析[J].河北经贸大学学报,2008,29(3):68-71.
作者姓名:闫邹先
作者单位:山东大学,经济学院,山东,济南,250100
摘    要:上市公司合谋问题一直是证券监管部门和理论界关注的热点和难点,而良好的激励约束机制对于防范上市公司合谋具有显著的积极作用。通过对上市公司的实证分析发现,在影响上市公司合谋的诸因素中,独立董事比例是最重要的因素,而高管的激励水平对于上市公司合谋的影响最弱。为了有效地防范上市公司的合谋行为,我们应当加大独立董事的比例和对上市公司高管的约束力。

关 键 词:上市公司合谋  灰色系统理论  实证分析
文章编号:1007-2101(2008)03-0068-04
修稿时间:2007年3月27日

Gray Correlation Analysis of the Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms to List Company's Collusion
Yan Zouxian.Gray Correlation Analysis of the Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms to List Company's Collusion[J].Journal Of Hebei University Of Economics and Trade,2008,29(3):68-71.
Authors:Yan Zouxian
Institution:Yan Zouxian
Abstract:The listed company collusion has been hot and difficulty spot for the securities supervision department and theoretical research.A good incentive and restraint mechanism will play a positive role in preventing the collusion.The empirical analysis of listed companies demonstrates that of the factors affecting the collusion,the percentage of independent directors is the strongest factor while the incentive force of senior managers is the weakest one.To effectively prevent listed company's collusion,we shall expand the percentage of independent directors and the restraint on senior managers.
Keywords:listed company's collusion  gray system theory  empirical analysis
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