| 汽车供应链动态联盟合作风险研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 李新剑.汽车供应链动态联盟合作风险研究[J].安徽商业高等专科学校学报,2013(1):32-33,50. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李新剑 |
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| 作者单位： | 安徽机电职业技术学院人文管理系,安徽芜湖241000 |
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| 摘 要： | 对整车厂商与联盟伙伴的博弈关系的研究表明，汽车供应链联盟在运行过程中会存在个体理性和团体理性的矛盾，这种矛盾会使联盟的稳定性面临风险。应通过建立高效信息沟通机制和信息沟通平台、完善的利益分配机制和长效的激励机制等措施，维护汽车供应链联盟的稳定合作关系，化解联盟合作风险。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 汽车供应链 动态联盟 合作 风险 |
Research on the Cooperation Risk of Dynamic Alliance in Automobile Supply Chain |
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| Authors: | LI Xin-jian |
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| Institution: | LI Xin-jian (Department of Humanities and Management, Anhui Technical College df Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Wuhu 241000, Anhui, China) |
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| Abstract: | It is shown in the research of the game relationship between automobile manufacturers and alliance partners that there exists the contradiction between individual rationality and group rationality for automobile supply chain alliance in the course of operation. This contradiction is easy to make the risk of alliance stability. It is therefore necessary to maintain the stable cooperation relationship of automobile supply chain alliance and make less of its cooperation risk by the establish-ment of effective information communication mechanism and platform, perfect benefit distribution mechanism and long term incentive mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | game theory automobile supply chain dynamic alliance cooperation risk |
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