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美国责任保险危机根源的经济分析
引用本文:张瑞纲,许谨良.美国责任保险危机根源的经济分析[J].广东商学院学报,2012,27(1):88-95.
作者姓名:张瑞纲  许谨良
作者单位:上海财经大学金融学院,上海,200433
基金项目:上海财经大学研究生科研创新项目
摘    要:利用经济学的方法研究责任保险危机与过度诉讼、超额惩罚性赔偿金之间的关系,指出21世纪美国责任保险危机的出现是由其日益增长的惩罚性赔偿金和过度诉讼倾向所导致的。惩罚性赔偿金的存在会造成过度诉讼的加剧,且责任保险本身的存在也会造成过度诉讼。过度诉讼的来源根植于法庭诉讼对责任保险投保人的判决偏好。最后,总结了美国医疗责任保险危机对我国的启示。

关 键 词:责任保险危机  过度诉讼  惩罚性赔偿金  判决偏好  动态博弈

An Economic Analysis of the Cause of the American Liability Insurance Crisis
ZHANG Rui-gang , XU Jin-liang.An Economic Analysis of the Cause of the American Liability Insurance Crisis[J].Journal of Guangdong Business College,2012,27(1):88-95.
Authors:ZHANG Rui-gang  XU Jin-liang
Institution:(Financial Institute,Shanghai University of Finance and economics,Shanghai,200433,China)
Abstract:By using the method of economics,this paper studies the relationship between liability insurance crisis,excessive litigations and superabundant punitive damages.It points out that the appearance of the America liability insurance crisis results from the growing punitive damages and the trend of excessive litigations.The second part of the paper finds that the existence of punitive damages will lead to the rise of excessive litigations.The third part concludes that the existence of liability insurance will bring about excessive litigations.The fourth part reveals an important finding that the source of excessive litigations is from the court’s judgment preference for liability insurance applicants.At last,it summarizes the enlightenment of the America liability insurance crisis to China.
Keywords:liability insurance crisis  excessive litigation  punitive damages  judgment preference  dynamic game theory
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