| 广佛同城化的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 叶祥松,彭良燕.广佛同城化的博弈分析[J].广东商学院学报,2011(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 叶祥松 彭良燕 |
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| 作者单位： | 广东商学院经济贸易与统计学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 2009年广东省人文社会科学基地重大项目(09JDXM79014) |
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| 摘 要： | 由于广州和佛山分属不同行政区域,两地政府的地方保护主义和机会主义行为导致广佛同城化难以深入进行并陷入困境。要走出广佛同城化困境,应考虑构建责任明确、在管理和协调广佛同城化方面权威、高效的超广佛政府的第三方组织——广佛管理协调行政委员会。
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| 关 键 词： | 同城化 区域一体化 博弈 第三方组织 “广佛困境”模型 |
Game Analysis on Guangzhou-Foshan Integration |
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| YE Xiang-song,PENG Liang-yan.Game Analysis on Guangzhou-Foshan Integration[J].Journal of Guangdong Business College,2011(2). |
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| Authors: | YE Xiang-song PENG Liang-yan |
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| Institution: | YE Xiang-song,PENG Liang-yan (The Faculty of Economics,Guangdong University of Business Studies,Guangzhou 510320,China) |
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| Abstract: | Since Guangzhou and Foshan belong to different administrative area,the Guangzhou-Foshan integration process cannot go further and experiences Guang-Fo dilemma due to local protectionism and opportunistic behavior of the local governments.To get out of theGuang-Fo dilemma,we must build a third-party organization that transcends the Guangzhou and Foshan governments: the Administrative Committee of Guang-Fo Management and Coordination,whose responsibilities should be clearly-defined,authoritative and efficient... |
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| Keywords: | integration regional integration Game theory third-party organization Guang-Fo dilemma |
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