经理股票期权的理论分析与现实选择

代理理论指出 ,信息不对称导致的逆向选择和道德风险会损害委托人的利益 ,委托人必须给予代理人适当的激励来减少代理成本。经理股票期权作为一种长期激励机制 ,实现了剩余索取权与控制权的对应 ,因而是一种有效的激励约束机制。文章在对ESO方案设计要点进行介绍之后 ,结合我国进行股票期权激励的现状 ,对其存在的问题进行了具体分析。

The theoretic interpretation and practical analysis of the executive stock option

This paper applies the Principal and Agent Theory to explain the longterm incentive mechanism of ESO.ESO can realize the correspondence of residual claims and control rights in enterprise,so it can avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard which are caused by asymmetric information effectively.After having briefing the main contents of ESO plan,this paper analyses the problems that exist in the practice of ESO in China.We still need to standardize the ESO in China and supply needed outside circumstances for ESO.