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政府竞争:行政区经济运行中的地方政府行为分析
引用本文:李广斌,谷人旭.政府竞争:行政区经济运行中的地方政府行为分析[J].城市问题,2005(6):70-75.
作者姓名:李广斌  谷人旭
作者单位:华东师范大学资源与环境科学学院
摘    要:从政府竞争的角度,为行政区经济形成构建了一个政府行为分析框架.通过对政府竞争和博弈三个层面的考察,揭示区域经济发展中的各层级政府间互动关系,对行政区经济形成的深层次原因提供较为系统的解释.

关 键 词:政府竞争  机会主义  政绩  任期制  行政区经济
文章编号:1002-2031(2005)06-0070-06
修稿时间:2005年5月25日

Government competition: an analysis of local government behaviors of administrative economy
LI Guang-bin & colleagues.Government competition: an analysis of local government behaviors of administrative economy[J].Urban Problems,2005(6):70-75.
Authors:LI Guang-bin & colleagues
Institution:LI Guang-bin & colleagues
Abstract:Previous studies focused on the effects of china's administrative decentralization,tax incentives and administrative divisions on the causes of administrative economy,but all of those can't provide a powerful explanation to it.Based on the past studied,the paper builds an analysis framework of government behaviors from the there aspects of government competition to explain how administrative economy occurred.The paper argues that china's administrative decentralization and tax incentives brought about government competition,but can't be bound to lead to local protectionism,market's divisions and duplicative investment,that opportunism and game between governments are an important factor of the occurrence of administrative economy.Local governments under political tournaments have little room for regional cooperation but much room for excessive competition.Office tenure stimulates duplicative investment and excessive competition among regional development.
Keywords:government competition  opportunism  promotion incentives  office tenure  administrative economy
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