| 中国政府预算审计制度博弈分析——基于利益相关者理论的视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 王祯昌,闫泽滢.中国政府预算审计制度博弈分析——基于利益相关者理论的视角[J].审计与经济研究,2012,27(5):11-19. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王祯昌 闫泽滢 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中央财经大学财政学院,北京,100081
2. 安徽大学经济学院,安徽合肥,230601 |
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| 基金项目： | 安徽省高校省级优秀青年人才基金项目(2012SQRW012) |
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| 摘 要： | 根据利益相关者理论,利益相关者具有剩余控制权和剩余索取权,利益相关者的控制和博弈是政府预算审计制度改革的重要驱动力.政府预算审计制度应健全政府预算审计利益均衡机制,实现利益相关者整体利益最大化.基于利益相关者理论的视角,分析政府预算审计利益相关者之间的相互博弈行为,提出利益导向下的中国政府预算审计制度改革对策.
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| 关 键 词： | 政府预算审计制度 利益相关者 预算审计制度博弈 政府审计 国家审计 屡审屡犯 屡犯屡审 |
An Analysis of Government Budget Auditing Game of China:From the Perspective of Stakeholder Theory |
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| WANG Zhenchang
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YAN Zeying.An Analysis of Government Budget Auditing Game of China:From the Perspective of Stakeholder Theory[J].Economy & Audit Study,2012,27(5):11-19. |
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| Authors: | WANG Zhenchang YAN Zeying |
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| Institution: | WANG Zhenchang,YAN Zeyin(School of Public Finance,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China; School of Economics,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China) |
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| Abstract: | According to the stakeholder theory,the stakeholder has the residual rights of control and the claims to residue.The control and game of the stakeholder is a driving force to promote the government budget auditing reform.The budget auditing is to achieve stakeholders’ balance of benefits to its minimum.From the perspective of stakeholder theory,we analyze the game of the budget audit system among concerning stakeholders and finally propose interest-oriented innovation to a budget audit system in question. |
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| Keywords: | government budget audit system stakeholders budget audit system game government audit state audit repeated auditing and repeated committing repeated committing and repeated auditing |
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