Governing local supplier opportunism in China: Moderating role of institutional forces |
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| Institution: | 1. Marketing, School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;2. Marketing, Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;3. Marketing, College of Business, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong;4. Chongqing Key Laboratory of Logistics, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;1. Department of Marketing, Shenzhen University, Nanhai Ave 3688, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China;2. Sprott School of Business, 806 Dunton Tower, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6, Canada;3. Department of Marketing, Academic Building 1, City University of Hong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong |
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| Abstract: | China provides a vast and prominent manufacturing base, so curtailing its local supplier opportunism represents a primary concern for local and foreign buyers. Drawing on institutional theory, this study examines how regulatory uncertainty and relationship structure moderate the role of contracts and trust in restricting local supplier opportunism in China. An analysis of 293 buyer–supplier dyads in China reveals that contracts are more effective in deterring supplier opportunism when regulatory uncertainty is high. In addition, contracts help curtail opportunism more in domestic, compared with international, buyer–supplier relationships, whereas trust is more effective in restricting supplier opportunism in international relationships than in domestic ones. |
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| Keywords: | Supplier opportunism Contracts Trust Institutional theory China |
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