| 多个大股东治理机制的有效性——基于制度环境的分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 栾天虹.多个大股东治理机制的有效性——基于制度环境的分析[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2008,22(2):65-68. |
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| 作者姓名： | 栾天虹 |
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| 作者单位： | 浙江工商大学金融学院,浙江杭州,310018 |
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| 摘 要： | 结合制度环境深入考察了多个大股东的行为选择及其作为一种治理机制的有效性问题,我们发现,多个大股东的公司治理作用只有在特定的制度环境下才是有效的,而在制度环境很不完善的条件下,外部大股东的监督是不存在或者说多个大股东的公司治理作用是无效的。
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| 关 键 词： | 多个大股东 监督 合谋 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-6701(2008)02-0065-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2008年2月20日 |
The Efficiency of Governance Mechanism by Many Big Shareholders——Analysis Based on Institutional Environment |
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| LUAN Tian-hong.The Efficiency of Governance Mechanism by Many Big Shareholders——Analysis Based on Institutional Environment[J].Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce,2008,22(2):65-68. |
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| Authors: | LUAN Tian-hong |
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| Abstract: | By considering the institutional environment,this paper analyses behavior choices of big shareholders and the validity of this govern mechanism.We find that governance of many big shareholders is effective only when being really under specially institutional environment.Supervision from big outside shareholders is not existing,in other word this govern mechanism is ineffective when the environment is not perfect. |
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| Keywords: | many big shareholders monitor collusion |
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