首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

股权分置改革、管理层薪酬业绩敏感性与机构投资者治理效应——基于中国上市公司的经验证据
引用本文:卢锐,邢怡媛.股权分置改革、管理层薪酬业绩敏感性与机构投资者治理效应——基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2011(5).
作者姓名:卢锐  邢怡媛
作者单位:中山大学岭南学院;中山大学财务与国资管理处;
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目(70802062,71032006); 中山大学青年教师培育项目(0909064)
摘    要:股权分置改革是影响我国上市公司治理的重大制度变革,而管理层薪酬业绩敏感性是衡量公司治理有效性的常用指标。文章旨在分析与检验股权分置改革前后我国上市公司管理层薪酬业绩敏感性的变化以及机构投资者在这一过程中的治理效应。基于2002年-2008年我国A股面板数据的经验证据显示:股权分置改革后,我国上市公司管理层薪酬业绩敏感性总体上得到了提高;机构投资者有助于提高管理层薪酬业绩敏感性,但在股权分置改革前后的变化不显著;相对于境内机构投资者,合格境外机构投资者在股改后显著提高了管理层薪酬业绩敏感性。

关 键 词:股权分置改革  机构投资者  薪酬业绩敏感性  治理效应

Split Share Reform,Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity and Governance Effect of Institutional Investor:Empirical Evidence from China Listed Companies
LU Rui,XING Yi-yuan.Split Share Reform,Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity and Governance Effect of Institutional Investor:Empirical Evidence from China Listed Companies[J].Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce,2011(5).
Authors:LU Rui  XING Yi-yuan
Institution:LU Rui1,XING Yi-yuan2 ( 1.Lingnan College,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou Guangdong 510275,China,2.Office of Finance and University Asset,China)
Abstract:Split share reform is a fundamental institution revolution that affects the corporate governance of China listed companies.And the executive pay-performance sensitivity is the common measure for the effectiveness of corporate governance.Therefore,this paper aims to explore the change of executive pay-performance sensitivity before and after split share reform and the role of institutional investor during this process.Our empirical result that using the panel data of year 2001-2008 shows that the executive p...
Keywords:split share reform  institutional investor  pay-performance sensitivity  governance effect  
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号