| 投资方与项目公司的委托代理博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 崔秀敏,徐恒峰.投资方与项目公司的委托代理博弈分析[J].基建优化,2006,27(3):28-30. |
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| 作者姓名： | 崔秀敏 徐恒峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西安建筑科技大学,管理学院,西安,710055;郑州航空工业管理学院,郑州,450015
2. 河南文建建设监理有限责任公司,郑州,450015 |
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| 摘 要： | 项目投资中,投资人与项目公司之间存在着“委托-代理”关系。由于两者之间的信息非对称,导致了项目投资中道德风险的存在。借助信息经济学中的“委托-代理理论”建立了项目公司道德风险模型,定量的分析了如何通过设立约束机制使投资人实现利益最大化,得出了有利于提高投资人项目管理水平的分析结论。
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| 关 键 词： | 项目投资 信息不对称 "委托-代理理论" 道德风险模型 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-7717(2006)03-0028-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-22 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年3月22日 |
Analysis of the Game theory for Inversting with the Comissioning of the Project Company |
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| CUI Xiu-min,XU Heng-feng.Analysis of the Game theory for Inversting with the Comissioning of the Project Company[J].Optimization of Capital Construction,2006,27(3):28-30. |
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| Authors: | CUI Xiu-min XU Heng-feng |
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| Abstract: | During project investment,there is a"principal-agent" relation between investor and company.Between the two parties,there exists moral risk under asymmetric information.This paper builds a"moral risk model" between investor and company during the project investment by applying"principal-agent theory" in the information economics theory.On the basis of quantitative analysis of the model,this paper draws some conclusions,which is benefitial to the enhancement of the level of project management. |
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| Keywords: | project investment asymmetric information "principal-agent theory" moral risk model |
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