Strategyproof multiple assignment using quotas |
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Authors: | Szilvia Pápai |
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Institution: | Faculdade de Economi a, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estev?o Pinto, Campolide, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal (e-mail: spapai@fe.unl.pt), PT
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Abstract: | The allocation of heterogeneous and indivisible objects is considered where there is no medium of exchange. We characterize
the set of strategyproof, nonbossy, Pareto-optimal, and neutral social choice functions when preferences are monotonic and
quantity-monotonic. The characterized sets of social choice functions are sequential; agents are assigned their favorite objects
among the objects not given to others before them, subject to a quota.
Received: 5 January 1999 / Accepted: 14 June 1999 |
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Keywords: | JEL classification:C7 D63 D78 |
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