Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space |
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Authors: | Guillaume Bernis Gaël Giraud |
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Institution: | 1. Calyon, Capital Markets - GCE, 9 Quai du Président P. Doumer, 92920, Paris-La Défense, France) 2. CERMSEM, Université Paris 1, 106-112 Bd de l'H?pital, 75647, Paris cedex 13, France
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Abstract: | This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered
preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under
a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our
mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria.
Received: 11 December 2003, Accepted: 29 July 2005
JEL Classification:
D41, D43, D51
We thank (without implicating) Prof. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau and Cuong Le Van for helpful comments. The views expressed in this
paper reflect those of the authors and not necessarily those of Calyon. |
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Keywords: | Mechanism design constrained Walras equilibria Banach lattice non-ordered preferences |
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