The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions |
| |
Authors: | Fran?ois Maréchal Pierre-Henri Morand |
| |
Institution: | 1. CRESE, University of Franche-Comté, 30 avenue de l’observatoire, BP 1559, 25009, Besan?on Cedex, France
|
| |
Abstract: | We determine the conditions under which the seller in a first-price sealed-bid auction has an incentive to reveal his private information about the mean of bidders’ valuations in order to increase his expected revenue. With risk-neutral bidders, we show that the seller’s expected revenue is higher when information is revealed. However, when bidders are risk-averse, this result does not necessarily hold; it depends on the bidders’ risk-aversion level and on the number of bidders. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|