Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade |
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Authors: | Lars-Gunnar Svensson Bo Larsson |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Lund University, Box 7082, SE-22007 Lund, Sweden |
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Abstract: | We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model - where a finite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a finite number of individuals - to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consumes at most one object. In this environment we analyze the core of the economy and characterize the set of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms. As an alternative approach, we consider property rights implicitly defined by a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism and show a core property for the mechanism-induced endowment rule.Received: 19 February 2004, Accepted: 14 April 2005, JEL Classification:
C71, C78, D71, D78We would like to thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Financial support from The Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged by Lars-Gunnar Svensson. Financial support from The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged by Bo Larsson. |
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Keywords: | Strategy-proof core housing market sequential trade |
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