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Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
Authors:José Alcalde  Matthias Dahm
Institution:(1) IUDESP and Departament de Fonaments de l’Anàlisi Econòmica, University of Alicante, Ctra. San Vicente s/n, 03071 Alicante, Spain;(2) Departamento de Economía, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Avenida de la Universitat, 1, 43204 Reus (Tarragona), Spain
Abstract:We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock’s proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests). An additional desirable feature is that the serial contest is homogeneous of degree zero in contestants’ efforts. The family is characterized by a parameter representing how sensitive the outcome is to contestants’ efforts. It encompasses as polar cases the (fair) lottery and the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Equilibria have a close relationship to those of the (deterministic) all-pay auction and important properties of the latter hold for the serial contest, too.
Keywords:Rent-seeking  (Non-)deterministic contest  Contest success function  All-pay auction  Rent dissipation  Exclusion principle  Preemption effect  Cap  Campaign contributions
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