| 考虑声誉效应的外包中服务商激励机制 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 谭云清,李元旭.考虑声誉效应的外包中服务商激励机制[J].上海管理科学,2010,32(3):81-83. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 谭云清 李元旭 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 复旦大学管理学院,上海,200433;上海立信会计学院,工商管理学院,上海,201620
2. 复旦大学管理学院,上海,200433 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 在考虑声誉的情形下，建立一个博弈模型，探讨了外包中服务商激励约束机制的内在机理。分析表明：声誉对服务商激励有重要影响，可以提高服务商在前期的努力程度，在某种程度上，声誉效应能很好地解决来自服务商的道德风险问题。同时，文章还提出了基于服务商声誉的约束机制建设的建议。
|
| 关 键 词： | 外包 服务商 激励约束 声誉 |
The incentive mechanism of outsourcing for the supplier: Based on reputation effect |
| |
| Tan Yunqing,Li Yuanxu.The incentive mechanism of outsourcing for the supplier: Based on reputation effect[J].Shanghai Managent Science,2010,32(3):81-83. |
| |
| Authors: | Tan Yunqing Li Yuanxu |
| |
| Institution: | Tan Yunqing, Li Yuanxu |
| |
| Abstract: | A game model with incomplete information on the client and supplier is established. On the basis of reputation concerns, the inner mechanism of outsourcing for the supplier was discussed. It is shown that the reputation effect can improve the supplier＇s effort level and solve the moral hazard in some extent. It also suggests how to build the reputation system effectively. |
| |
| Keywords: | Outsourcing The supplier Incentive mechanism Reputation |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
