人力资本投资的资产专用性问题及其防范机制研究

专用性人力资本投资所具有的不完全契约性及资产专用性等特征必然导致了投资双方的激励缺乏问题。文章通过构建专用性人力资本投资的“囚徒困境”模型说明了该现状，并在此模型基础上从不完全信息下的静态博弈到动态博弈再到无限次合作博弈构建了专用性人力资本投资的决策模型。通过对决策模型的分析，文章找出了防范机制的三个关键点，即：稳定的雇佣关系、充分的授权激励以及充分的流动机制。

Research on Asset Specificity of Human Capital Investment and Risk-prevention Mechanism

The characteristics of incomplete contract and asset specificity which belong to specific human capital investment will inevitably lead to the problem of the lack of incentives from both investors. This article describes the status quo based on the＂Prisonerrs Dilemma＂ model of investment in specific human capital,and furtherly establishes specific human capital investment decision-making model from incomplete information static game to dynamic game and unlimited cooperation game. By these models this article finds out the three key points of risk-prevention mechanism that are stable employment relationship, fully authorized incentive and sufficient flow mechanism.