Locally robust contracts for moral hazard |
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Institution: | 1. International Business School Suzhou, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Jiangsu 215123, China;2. Department of Economics, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario M5B 2K3, Canada;1. Department of Economics and Management, Université de Cergy-Pontoise & THEMA,Cergy-Pontoise, 95011, France;2. Department of Economics, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 30602, USA;1. University of Bielefeld, Germany;2. University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, France;3. Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, France |
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Abstract: | We consider a moral hazard problem in which the principal has a slight uncertainty about how the agent’s actions translate into output. An incentive contract can be made robust against an amount of uncertainty, at the cost of a loss to the principal on the order of , by refunding a small fraction of profit to the agent. We show that as goes to zero, this construction is essentially optimal, in the sense of minimizing the worst-case loss, among all modifications to the contract that do not depend on the details of the environment. |
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Keywords: | Contract Principal–agent problem Local robustness Worst-case Optimality-robustness tradeoff |
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