Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice |
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Institution: | 1. Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan;2. Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, AS2 Level 6, 1 Arts Link, Singapore 117570, Singapore |
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Abstract: | We study the effect of introducing a bilingual option on the long run equilibrium outcome in a class of two-strategy coordination games with distinct payoff and risk dominant equilibria under the logit choice rule. Existing results show that in the class of two-strategy games under consideration, the inefficient risk dominant equilibrium is selected in the long run under noisy best response models. We show that if the cost of the bilingual option is sufficiently low then the efficient payoff dominant equilibrium will be selected in the long run under the logit choice rule. |
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Keywords: | Evolutionary game theory Stochastic stability Logit choice Bilingual games |
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