Unanimity,anonymity, and infinite population |
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| Institution: | 1. LAMETA – INRA – CNRS – SupAgro-Univ. Montpellier, 2 place Viala, 34060 Montpellier, France;2. IESEG School of Management – LEM – CNRS, 3 rue de la Digue, 59000 Lille, France;3. CIRED–CNRS–EHESS–Ecole des Ponts ParisTech, 45 bis avenue de la Belle-Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent Sur Marne Cedex, France;1. Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabancı University, Orhanli, Tuzla, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey;2. Poole School of Management, North Carolina State University, 27695, Raleigh, NC, USA;1. Department of Economics and Management, Université de Cergy-Pontoise & THEMA,Cergy-Pontoise, 95011, France;2. Department of Economics, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 30602, USA |
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| Abstract: | This paper is concerned with the implications of unanimity and anonymity for the Arrovian social choice theory when population is infinite. Contrary to the finite population case, various unanimity and anonymity axioms can be formulated. We show a tension between unanimity and anonymity by providing possibility and impossibility results. We also examine the case in which social preferences are allowed to be quasi-transitive. |
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| Keywords: | Social choice Arrow’s impossibility theorem Unanimity Anonymity Ultrafilter |
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