供应链应收账款质押融资的双重Stackelberg博弈分析

供应链金融是银行将核心企业和上下游企业联系在一起提供灵活运用的金融产品和服务的一种融资模式。文章从供应链金融的视角研究供应链成员企业的融资决策,将双重Stackelberg博弈应用于供应链金融的三种融资模式之一的应收账款质押融资,通过博弈模型的建立分析供应链金融中各个参与主体的期望收益,考察融资运作的影响因素,给出了参与主体选择策略的条件,为成员企业融资决策提供依据,维持供应链整体稳定运行。

Two Stackelberg Models Analysis of Supply Chain Financing with Accounts Receivable

Supply chain finance is a financing mode that bank put the core enterprise and upstream and downstream member enterprises together with flexible using of financial products and services. In this paper, financing decision of supply chain member enterprise is studied from the perspective of the supply chain financing, it is applied two Stackelberg models to the pledge of accounts receivable financing which is one of three kinds of supply chain financing mode, through the establishment of game model, we analyze expected revenue of each supply chain finance participation, examine factors affecting financing operations, and gives the conditions of participation selection strategy, it is provided the basis for analysis of the member enterprise in financing decision-making.