基于博弈的专利诉讼与交叉许可决策研究

随着企业研发能力和知识产权保护意识的逐渐增强,越来越多的企业通过建立专利壁垒来保证自身的持续竞争力与市场地位。"专利丛林"的现象导致企业进行技术创新以及新产品的开发举步维艰。为了节省成本,科技企业之间相互的专利侵权现象时有发生。面对相互的专利侵权现象,有的企业运用专利诉讼的手段与对方发起"专利大战"以维持自身的竞争优势,也有的企业通过专利的交叉许可协议,与对方建立长期的专利合作关系。本文通过构建博弈模型,研究了企业进行专利诉讼以及交叉许可的选择决策的机理。

The Study on the Strategy of the Patent Litigation and Cross-licensing Based on Game Theory

With growing capabilities of research and development, as well as intellectual property protection, more and more enterprises try to establish patent barriers to ensure their continued competitiveness and market position. ＆quot;Patent thickets＆quot; makes technological innovation and new product development extremely difficult for enterprises. In order to save costs, patent infringement occur frequently among companies. To lead patent infringement to an end, some companies use means of patent litigation to maintain competitive advantage. Others try to establish a long-term relationship of cooperation through patent cross-licensing. This article constructs a game model to study the mechanism on selection of patent litigation and cross-licensing.