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经销商选择博弈分析
引用本文:刘宏涛,王维华.经销商选择博弈分析[J].价值工程,2012,31(5):101-102.
作者姓名:刘宏涛  王维华
作者单位:辽宁石油化工大学顺华能源学院,抚顺,113001
摘    要:在我国当前的市场环境下,营销渠道对企业运营的影响日益显著,而经销商能力的强弱是营销渠道能否高效运行的关键因素。为了更好的解决经销商选择的问题,采用经济学的研究思路,通过构建经销商选择博弈模型,求得纯策略精炼贝叶斯均衡下的分离均衡情况下的激励值,并通过该激励值区分经销商能力高低的类型,由此企业可以选择合适的经销商。

关 键 词:营销渠道  经销商  博弈模型  分离均衡

Game Theory Analysis on Dealer Selection
Liu Hongtao , Wang Weihua.Game Theory Analysis on Dealer Selection[J].Value Engineering,2012,31(5):101-102.
Authors:Liu Hongtao  Wang Weihua
Institution:Liu Hongtao;Wang Weihua (Liaoning Shihua University Shunhua Energy lnstitute,Funshun 113001,China)
Abstract:At present,the effects that the marketing channels work on enterprises enhance gradually and the ability of dealers is the key factor to the efficient operation of channel.In order to solve the problem of dealer choice,set up the game model for dealer choice on the basis of economics and get an incentive value in a pure strategy of a balanced refining Bayesian separating equilibrium to confirm the actual type of the dears.So the enterprise can choose the correct dealer by this way.
Keywords:marketing channel  dealer  game model  separating equilibrium
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