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第二价格密封招标中串谋预防机制研究
引用本文:杨颖梅.第二价格密封招标中串谋预防机制研究[J].价值工程,2012,31(9):98-100.
作者姓名:杨颖梅
作者单位:北京信息科技大学经济管理学院,北京,100192
基金项目:北京信息科技大学校基金
摘    要:第二价格密封拍卖和招标机制作为一种可以使投标人"说真话"的机制受到理论界的广泛关注。本文研究了第二价格密封招标中,如何采用公开保留价机制对投标人平行串谋进行预防。首先建立了第二价格密封招标的串谋组织报价及利润分配机制,然后分析了存在串谋时招标人应采用的公开保留价定价机制,最后研究了串谋组织成员人数与招标公开保留价之间的关系。

关 键 词:招标  串谋  最优公开保留价

Conspiracy Prevention Mechanism in the Second Price Sealing Bidding
Yang Yingmei.Conspiracy Prevention Mechanism in the Second Price Sealing Bidding[J].Value Engineering,2012,31(9):98-100.
Authors:Yang Yingmei
Institution:Yang Yingmei(Beijing Information Science & Technology University School of Economics and Management,Beijing 100192,China)
Abstract:The second price sealing auction and bidding mechanism as a mechanism which can make a bidder "tell the truth" attracts the concern of the theoretical circles.The article studies how to use public reservation mechanism to prevent conspiracy in bidding.First,establish conspiracy organization and profit distribution mechanism in the second price sealing offer,and analyzes the pricing mechanism of public reservation price that tenderee when they have conspiracy.At last,it studies the relationship of the number of conspiracy organization member and bidding public reservation price.
Keywords:tender  conspiracy  optimal public reserve price
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