| 基于博弈论的职业经理人道德风险规避分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 梁敏,张婷婷.基于博弈论的职业经理人道德风险规避分析[J].价值工程,2006,25(11):116-118. |
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| 作者姓名： | 梁敏 张婷婷 |
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| 作者单位： | 江西理工大学,赣州,341000 |
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| 摘 要： | 当代博弈论得到了长足的发展,许多的经济学家和管理学家都尝试运用博弈论的方法论来解释、分析和解决现实经济领域和管理领域所存在的种种问题。本文尝试运用现代博弈论来分析职业经理人的行为选择,通过分析说明企业出资人应该如何设计有效的激励机制来规避职业经理人的道德风险。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 职业经理人 激励约束机制 道德风险 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-4311（2006）11-0116-03 |
Analyze How to Avoid the Moral Risk of Professional Managers Based on Game Theory |
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| Liang Min,Zhang Tingting.Analyze How to Avoid the Moral Risk of Professional Managers Based on Game Theory[J].Value Engineering,2006,25(11):116-118. |
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| Authors: | Liang Min Zhang Tingting |
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| Institution: | Jiangxi University of Technology,Ganzhou 341000,China |
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| Abstract: | Nowadays, with game theory developing, many economists and management experts try to use it to explain and solve problems about economics and management. This paper will analyze the behaviors of professional managers based on game theory, and conclude how to design effective incentive institution for the owners to avoid the moral risk of professional managers in the company. |
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| Keywords: | game theory professional manager incentive institution moral risk |
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