| 上市公司职业经理人股权激励制度的研究——基于委托代理理论 |
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| 引用本文： | 侯静怡.上市公司职业经理人股权激励制度的研究——基于委托代理理论[J].价值工程,2012,31(36):145-146. |
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| 作者姓名： | 侯静怡 |
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| 作者单位： | 长安大学经济与管理学院,西安,710064 |
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| 摘 要： | 基于委托代理理论的基本原理,分析了股权激励制度对职业经理人的作用,文章主要侧重于从股权激励制度而引出的新的道德风险问题进行讨论,从宏观和微观的两个方面给予一定的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 委托代理关系 股权激励 |
The Listed Company Professional Executive Equity Incentive System Research:Based on the Principal-agent Theory |
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| HOU Jing-yi.The Listed Company Professional Executive Equity Incentive System Research:Based on the Principal-agent Theory[J].Value Engineering,2012,31(36):145-146. |
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| Authors: | HOU Jing-yi |
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| Institution: | HOU Jing-yi(School of Economics and Management,Chang’an University,Xi’an 710064,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the basic principle of the principal-agent theory,this paper analyzes the role of stock ownership incentive system on the professional managers.This paper mainly focuses on the equity incentive system and new moral risk problem is discussed,and puts forward some opinions from the macro and micro aspects to give some proposals. |
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| Keywords: | incentive mechanism principal-agent relationship stock ownership incentive |
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