| 投标人平行串谋与最优公开保留价博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王文举,杨颖梅.投标人平行串谋与最优公开保留价博弈分析[J].经济与管理研究,2011(10). |
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| 作者姓名： | 王文举 杨颖梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 首都经济贸易大学;北京信息科技大学经济管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金重点项目“我国碳排放总量确定、指标分配、实现路径机制综合研究”(项目编号10AJY002); 北京市高等学校人才强教深化计划高层次人才资助项目“经济问题博弈分析与动态模拟研究”(项目编号PHR20100513); 北京市优秀博士学位论文指导教师人文社科项目“博弈论应用、定量分析及经济仿真研究”(项目编号YB20091003801) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文将投标人平行串谋问题与招标人公开保留价定价策略相结合,研究了第二价格密封招标方式下投标串谋联盟的串谋报价及利润分配机制,分析了串谋联盟的存在对非串谋联盟中成员的投标策略和期望利润的影响,揭示了串谋联盟成员人数与串谋联盟总收益之间的关系,探讨了招标人公开保留价定价策略、串谋联盟成员人数与招标公开保留价之间的关系,指出了招标人应通过降低公开保留价的方式来防止或减少投标人平行串谋行为的发生。
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| 关 键 词： | 招投标 平行串谋 最优公开保留价 博弈论 |
Game Analysis of Bidders' Parallel Collusion and the Optimal Public Reserve Price |
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| WANG Wen-ju,YANG Ying-mei.Game Analysis of Bidders'' Parallel Collusion and the Optimal Public Reserve Price[J].Research on Economics and Management,2011(10). |
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| Authors: | WANG Wen-ju YANG Ying-mei |
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| Institution: | WANG Wen-ju~1,YANG Ying-mei~2 (1.School of Economics,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,2.School of Economics and Management,Beijing Information Science and Technology University,Beijing 100192) |
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| Abstract: | From this point of bidders' parallel collusion,this paper studies the second - price sealed bidding optimal public pricing strategy.First,this paper gives the bidding price and the profit distribution mechanism of the conspiracy alliance. Second,this paper analyzes how the presence of conspiracy alliance affects the bidding strategies and the expected profit,and reveals the relationship between the number of collusion and the total revenue.Finally,this paper obtains the relationship between the number of co... |
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| Keywords: | Bidding Parallel Collusion Optimal Public Reserve Price Game Theory |
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