基于博弈论的中欧国际班列政府补贴优化——以“义新欧”为例

针对中欧国际班列发展中存在的政府补贴优化问题,制定了一个基于中欧国际班列运营企业集装箱运输量和服务水平的补贴方案。运用不完全动态博弈分析政府、运营企业及托运人之间的关系,假设以实现三者效益最大化为目标,构建了一个以政府补贴为变量的三阶段博弈模型,采用逆行归纳法对模型进行求解,得到运营企业的补贴系数和努力程度系数。参考“义新欧”班列的运行数据,进行实证分析,并帮助政府确定合适的补贴金额。

Optimization of Government Subsidies for China-Europe International Express Trains Based on Game Theory:In the Case of Yi-Xin-Ou Railway

In order to optimize government subsidies in the development of the China-Europe International Express,we formulated a subsidy program for the China-Europe International Express operating companies based on their container traffic volume and service level.Next,using incomplete dynamic game analysis,we looked into the relationship between the government,operating companies and shippers,and assuming the goal of maximizing the revenue of the three parties combined,built a three-stage game model with government subsidies as the variable,which was then solved using retrograde induction,obtaining the subsidy coefficient and effort coefficient of the operating companies.At last,we had an empirical analysis using the operating data of the Yi-Xin-Ou railway,and helped the government determine the appropriate extent of subsidy.