| 基于监督与惩罚的食品供应链突发事件治理研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 肖开红.基于监督与惩罚的食品供应链突发事件治理研究[J].物流技术,2012(15):345-347. |
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| 作者姓名： | 肖开红 |
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| 作者单位： | 河南工业大学管理学院;长安大学经济与管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家软科学研究项目(2010GXS5D233);河南省软科学研究项目(112400430030) |
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| 摘 要： | 构建以食品供应链内核心企业为主导、其他成员企业为从属关系的监管博弈模型,分析核心企业所实施的惩罚力度和发现概率两种监管手段对防范供应链成员非诚信行为的作用,并对两种监管手段的效果进行比较分析。
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| 关 键 词： | 食品安全 供应链突发事件 博弈 监督与惩罚 |
Study on Food Supply Chain Emergency Governance Based on Supervision and Penalty |
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| XIAO Kai-hong.Study on Food Supply Chain Emergency Governance Based on Supervision and Penalty[J].Logistics Technology,2012(15):345-347. |
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| Authors: | XIAO Kai-hong |
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| Institution: | XIAO Kai-hong1,2(1.School of Management,Henan University of Technology,Zhengzhou 450001; 2.School of Economics & Management,Chang’an University,Xi’an 710064,China) |
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| Abstract: | In this paper we established a food supply chain supervision game model with the core enterprise of the supply chain as the leader and other member enterprises as followers,analyzed the effect of the supervisory means based on penalty and discovery respectively upon preventing dishonesty of supply chain members and compared the performance of the two means. |
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| Keywords: | food safety supply chain emergency game supervision and penalty |
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