A policy spectrum for spectrum economics |
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| Authors: | Benoît Freyens |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Computer Science and Information Engineering, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou, China;2. School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia;1. Department of Communications and Networking, Aalto University School of Electrical Engineering, PO Box 13000, FI-00076 AALTO, Finland;2. Department of Electrical Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Avda. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, 7820436 Macul, Santiago, Chile;3. Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Avda. Vicuña Mackenna 4860, 7820436 Macul, Santiago, Chile;1. Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA;1. School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, KAIST, Republic of Korea;2. Division of Information and Communication Convergence Engineering, Mokwon University, Republic of Korea;3. School of Business Administration, Ajou University, Republic of Korea;1. Computer Science Department, West Chester University, United States;2. School of Information Sciences, University of Pittsburgh, United States;3. Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, United States;4. School of Information Sciences, University of Pittsburgh, United States |
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| Abstract: | Recent reforms to radio spectrum regulation have sparked controversy over the respective merits of two mutually exclusive liberalization regimes: property rights and commons. This debate is restrictive because it is largely incomplete and misunderstood. It is also costly in terms of opposition and delays to reforms. Goals of efficient spectrum allocation are better served by a wider policy toolkit, inclusive of hybrid and intermediary regimes. In this article I sketch the contours of a ‘spectrum of spectrum regimes’, triangulating regulatory, private ownership and unlicensed approaches. I illustrate this triangulated model, which I then apply to confront allocative decisions in digital dividend policy, such as the FCC’s open access clause in the 700 MHz auction and Ofcom’s current review of UHF spectrum release in the 800 MHz band. |
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