A foundation for strategic agenda voting |
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| Institution: | 1. ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE, Spain;2. Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Spain;3. University of Michigan, United States;1. University of Heidelberg, Germany;2. University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands;1. University of Cologne, Department of Economics, Albertus-Magnus Platz, D-50923 Cologne, Germany;2. Department of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;1. Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom;2. Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan;3. WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin, Germany;4. Department of Economics, University of Heidelberg, Bergheimer Str. 58, 69115 Heidelberg, Germany;1. eBay Data Labs, United States;2. Harvard University, United States;3. Harvard Business School, United States |
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| Abstract: | We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure, and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures. |
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| Keywords: | Strategic voting Agendas Committees Institutions Axioms |
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