Efficient bidding with externalities |
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Authors: | Ins Macho-Stadler David Prez-Castrillo David Wettstein |
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Institution: | aDepartment of Economics and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain;bDepartment of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel |
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Abstract: | We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals. |
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Keywords: | Implementation Externalities Bidding Shapley value |
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