Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games |
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Authors: | Jack Robles |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Campus Box 256, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, 80309 |
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Abstract: | I apply a version of Kandori et al. (1993, Econometrica, 61, 29–56) and Young's (1993, Econometrica, 61, 57–84) evolutionary dynamic to finitely repeated coordination games. The dynamic is modified by allowing mutations to affect only off path beliefs. I find that repetition within a match leads agents to sacrifice current payoffs in order to increase payoffs in later stages. As a consequence, evolution leads to (almost) efficiency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C79. |
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