首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
Institution:1. Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada;2. Department of Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA;1. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States;2. Department of Economics, 107 Gardner Hall, CB 3305, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, United States;1. Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, United States;2. Department of Economics, WP Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, United States;3. Department of Economics, Shiv Nadar University, India;1. Department of Economics, Boston University, United States;2. Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn, Germany;1. Department of Political Science, 2137 Derby Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, United States of America;2. Department of Political Science, Department of Economics (secondary), and Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory, 4600 Wesley W. Posvar Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, United States of America
Abstract:This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiverʼs ideal action to one senderʼs private information depends on the other senderʼs private information. We show that the sendersʼ information transmissions exhibit strategic complementarity: more information transmitted by one sender leads to more information being transmitted by the other sender.
Keywords:
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号