Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer? |
| |
Authors: | Ilya Segal |
| |
Institution: | Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA |
| |
Abstract: | The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. These effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade when others trade more. The prohibitions reduce the aggregate trade in the former case, and have little or no effect in the latter case. The inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are linked to the sign of the relevant externalities, and are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions. |
| |
Keywords: | C72 G34 L42 033 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|