Theories of coalitional rationality |
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Authors: | Attila Ambrus |
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Institution: | Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States |
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Abstract: | This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying four basic properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional rationalizability. |
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Keywords: | C72 |
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