标尺竞争、地方官员自利行为与财政支出结构偏向

中国特色的财政联邦主义在本质上表现为财政分权与政治集权相结合,所以中国式标尺竞争就表现为"为增长而竞争"的晋升锦标赛。论文基于政治委托代理的研究视角,运用经济学理论中的"经济人"假设来研究地方官员的行为逻辑,研究表明:一方面,作为理性的经济人,地方政府官员必然追求本届政府或个人任职期限的短期政绩最大化;另一方面,为了能使自己在政治锦标赛中获胜,各个地方政府在配置财政资源时会竞相模仿从而使财政支出出现"结构趋同",这种趋同性会随着政治锦标赛的升级而一直处于锁定状态。所以,地方官员自利行为是导致财政支出结构偏向的根本原因。

Yardstick Competition,Local Officials Self-interest and the Fiscal Expenditure Structure Bias

Chinese characteristics of fiscal federalism in essence as fiscal decentralization and centralization of politics the combination,so Chinese type yardstick competition show "competition for growth" of the tournament.In this paper,based on a political principal-agent perspective,using economics theory "economic man" hypothesis to study local officials behavior logic,research shows that: on the one hand,as a rational economic man,local government officials must pursue the government or individual term short-term achievements maximization;on the other hand,in order to make their own in the political tournament wins,each local government in the allocation of financial resources will mimic each other so that the fiscal expenditure structural tend to convergence,which has been locked as political tournament upgrade.Therefore,local officials self-interest behavior is the result of fiscal expenditure structural bias.