法律制度变迁、审计师选择与企业价值——基于实际控制人掏空行为视角的实证研究

本文利用2004-2009年民营上市公司的数据,首次对2006年我国将实际控制人掏空行为列入刑法这一事件对上市公司的审计师选择和企业价值所产生的影响进行了实证研究。研究发现在加大对实际控制人掏空行为的处罚力度后,掏空风险较高的公司更倾向于聘请小型会计师事务所,而且实际控制人的掏空行为有所减少。刑法调整后,由于实际控制人与中小股东的代理问题得到了有效的缓解,存在掏空风险的公司的企业价值有了显著提升,且掏空风险高的公司企业价值提升得更为显著。进一步研究还发现:在抑制实际控制人掏空行为、提升企业价值方面,法律治理能替代独立审计治理的作用,降低企业的监督成本。

Changes in the Legal System,Auditor Choice and Firm Value: An Empirical Study Based on the Actual Controllers’ Tunneling Behavior

Using the data of private listed companies from 2004 to 2009,we empirically explore how the choices of auditor and firm value are impacted by the revisions of criminal law in 2006.We find that if controlling shareholders are subject to more severe punishments for opportunistic behavior,companies in higher tunneling risk will tend to hire smaller accounting firms,and controlling shareholders’ illegal occupation of listed companies’ capital will decrease.Following the revisions to the criminal law,the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders has been effectively alleviated,resulting in the value of high-tunneling-risk firms increase significantly.Furthermore,our research shows that the legal governance can substitute independent auditors’ governance,which will decrease the transaction cost.