Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Within and Across Boundaries and Shorelines: Ensemble of Darwin's Finches and Human Transaction Types |
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Authors: | Beth V Yarbrough Robert M Yarbrough |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002, USA |
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Abstract: | Synopsis: In the most famous example of the biological process of adaptive radiation, two forces explain the fourteen distinct
species of Darwin's finches on the Galápagos and Cocos Islands: First, populations adapt to their respective distinct ecological
environments. Second, previously separated populations come in contact and may adapt to mitigate inter-species competition.
The result is a complex pattern of homogeneity and heterogeneity among the birds, both on a single island and across islands.
This pattern reflects the finches' adaptations both to the distinct ecological conditions created by the visible shorelines
that separate the islands' niches and to the finches' own less-visible cultural and societal shorelines. The New Institutional
Economics highlights the fact that human institutional infrastructures also exhibit complex homogeneities and heterogeneities,
as we adapt those infrastructures to accomplish the tasks at hand in distinct geographic and societal contexts. Mixes of both
state enforcement and self-enforcement, through inter-temporal, inter-issue, and inter-actor linkages, provide support and
enforcement for transactions; and those mixes differ across transactions and across states. When transactions occur across
state or cultural shorelines, institutional infrastructures must be flexible enough to accommodate those differences, without
allowing the differences to become disguised protectionism or barriers to competition. These issues contribute to many of
the regulatory disputes associated with ‘globalization’. We briefly consider two concrete recent examples: (1) the European
Union–United States ‘Safe Harbor’ Agreement that regulates firms' policies toward Internet-data privacy; and (2) international
trade policy negotiations over regulation of ‘geographical indications’ (for example, Champagne or Roquefort) as means of
assuring product quality for processed foods.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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Keywords: | branding contracting geographical indications governance structures identity institutions linkage new economics of organization new institutional economics self enforcement territoriality of law |
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