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中国工程咨询企业技术合作创新行为演化博弈分析
引用本文:郭强,苟莉佳.中国工程咨询企业技术合作创新行为演化博弈分析[J].技术经济,2017,36(2).
作者姓名:郭强  苟莉佳
作者单位:西南交通大学 经济管理学院,成都,610031
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目"紧急救援情境下涉及决策回避的伦理决策行为研究",中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"中国高铁海外投资的政治风险、经济风险防控机制与应对策略研究",四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地系统科学与企业发展研究中心规划项目"四川省企业科技创新综合评价研究"
摘    要:结合中国工程咨询业的特征,利用演化博弈理论研究了中国工程咨询企业技术合作创新行为的动态演化过程,建立相应的博弈支付矩阵和复制动态方程,分析了工程咨询企业技术合作创新行为的演化路径及其影响因素。研究发现:合作创新成功概率、社会惩罚力度、知识泄露损失、科研人员努力程度的增大,或独自创新成功概率、知识窃取收益的减小,都会促进企业群体向选择坚持合作策略方向演化;合作双方约定的违约金能在一定程度上限制企业的机会主义行为,但是违约金并非越多越好。

关 键 词:工程咨询企业  合作创新  机会主义行为  演化博弈

Analysis on Evolutionary Game of Technology-cooperation Innovation Behavior of China's Engineering Consulting Firms
Guo Qiang,Gou Lijia.Analysis on Evolutionary Game of Technology-cooperation Innovation Behavior of China's Engineering Consulting Firms[J].Technology Economics,2017,36(2).
Authors:Guo Qiang  Gou Lijia
Abstract:Combining with the characteristics of China's engineering consulting industry,this paper studies the dynamic evolution process of technology-cooperation innovation behavior of engineering consulting firms by the evolutionary game theory,and it constructs the payoff matrix and the replicator dynamics equation to analyze the corresponding evolution paths and influencing factors.The results show as follows:the increasing of success rate of technology-cooperation innovation,social punishment,knowledge leakage loss and scientists' effort,or the decreasing of success rate of independent innovation and the income of knowledge appropriation,could promote engineering consulting firms to cooperate smoothly and stably in a long term;the liquidated damages as stipulated in the contract could restrain opportunistic behaviors during the cooperation effectively to a certain extent,but the amount of it should not be too large.
Keywords:engineering consulting firm  cooperation innovation  opportunistic behavior  evolutionary game
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