| 我国上市公司高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系 |
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| 引用本文： | 傅琳琳,李延喜,冯宝军.我国上市公司高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系[J].技术经济,2011,30(8):113-117. |
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| 作者姓名： | 傅琳琳 李延喜 冯宝军 |
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| 作者单位： | 大连理工大学管理与经济学部,大连,116024 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目“基于管理者行为特征的上市公司盈余管理约束模型研究”，教育部新世纪人才支持计划项目，中央高校基本科研业务费专项经费支持项目“中国资本流动中的价值和风险管理” |
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| 摘 要： | 以2006—2009年我国上市公司为研究样本,以操纵性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理程度的代理变量,以高管年薪、持股水平分别作为衡量其短期、长期薪酬水平的代理变量,实证检验了上市公司高管的长、短期薪酬水平及两者的交叉变量与上市公司盈余管理的因果关系。结果显示:高管的短期薪酬是我国上市公司盈余管理的基本诱因之一;高管年薪与持股水平的相互作用也会加强上市公司的盈余管理行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 盈余管理 管理层激励 管理层持股 薪酬契约 公司治理 |
Relationship between Executive′s Salary and Earning Management in Listed Companies |
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| Fu Linlin,Li Yanxi,Feng Baojun.Relationship between Executive′s Salary and Earning Management in Listed Companies[J].Technology Economics,2011,30(8):113-117. |
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| Authors: | Fu Linlin Li Yanxi Feng Baojun |
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| Institution: | (School of Management,Dalian University of Technology,Dalian 116024,China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper chooses the listed companies during the period from 2006 to 2009 as the research samples.By taking the discretionary accrual as the proxy variable of representing the degree of earning management,and taking the salary and the shareholding ratio as the proxy variable of representing the short-term and long-term compensation level of executives,this paper empirically studies the causal relationship between the long-term and short-term compensation level of executives as well as their cross variable and earning management.The results show as follows：executive′s salary is one of basic inducements for earning management in listed companies;the interaction of executive′s salary with shareholding ratio would also strengthen the earning management behaviors in listed companies. |
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| Keywords: | earning management management incentive managerial ownership pay contract corporate governance |
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