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基于竞赛模型的研发联盟资本投入博弈分析
引用本文:熊麟,冯婷婷,鲁若愚.基于竞赛模型的研发联盟资本投入博弈分析[J].技术经济,2013(6):21-25,137.
作者姓名:熊麟  冯婷婷  鲁若愚
作者单位:[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054 [2]北京工商大学经济学院,北京100048
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目“多主体参与的服务创新管理与运作管理”(700772068)
摘    要:深入研究了具有一定市场风险的、多企业参与新产品开发的研发投入问题。根据联盟结构和联盟成员收益分配方式,将联盟合作分为4种模式。研究结果显示:收益分配方式对联盟成员研发投入决策的影响大于联盟结构组成形式的影响;除跨功能联盟按研发投入比例分配收益时的联盟总研发投入随着联盟成员数的增加而增加外,其他3种模式下联盟总研发投入都随着联盟成员数的增加而减少;当联盟成员拥有更多的互补资源时,联盟的总研发投入量更多。

关 键 词:研发联盟  联盟结构  研发投入  竞赛模型

Game Analysis on Capital Investment of R&D Alliance Based on Contest Model
Xiong Lin,Feng Tingting,Lu Ruoyu.Game Analysis on Capital Investment of R&D Alliance Based on Contest Model[J].Technology Economics,2013(6):21-25,137.
Authors:Xiong Lin  Feng Tingting  Lu Ruoyu
Institution:1(1.School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 610054,China;2.School of Economics,Beijing Technology and Business University,Beijing 100048,China)
Abstract:This paper studies the R&D investment of multiple enterprises involvement in new product development in a risk market.The result shows as follows:the effect of profit sharing pattern on alliance members’R&D investment is bigger than that of alliance structure;alliance’s total R&D investment would increase with the increasing of alliance members when cross-function alliance distributes profit according to members’ R&D investment proportion;alliance’s total R&D investment would decrease with the increasing of alliance members in other three type of cooperation pattern;alliance has more R&D investment when alliance members have more complementary resources.
Keywords:R&D alliance  alliance structure  R&D investment  contest model
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