企业特征、高管薪酬结构与企业绩效

利用2005—2010年我国沪深两市A股非金融保险行业1654家上市公司的高管年度薪酬数据,结合企业特征,对不同类型企业的高管薪酬结构与企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究,细化锦标赛理论和行为理论在不同类型企业中可能形成的差异化实施效应。结果显示:我国不同类型的企业都比较适宜采用锦标赛理论制定高管薪酬激励政策,竞争性的高管薪酬结构对于提升企业绩效具有正面作用,均等化高管薪酬结构不利于企业的价值创造;相对于民营企业、小规模企业、低成长企业而言,我国国有企业、大规模企业、高成长企业更宜采用锦标赛理论设计企业高管薪酬结构。因此我国不宜对非金融保险行业国有企业的高管薪酬进行过度均等化的管制,否则会负面影响企业绩效提升和企业价值创造。

Firm Characteristic, Executive Pay Structure and Firm Performance

Using the data of annual executive pay of 1654 listed companies in non-finance and non-insurance industries during 2005-2010, this paper analyzes the relationship between executive pay structure and firm performance in various kinds of firms with different firm characteristics, and details the possible different implementation effects of two theories applied in different kinds of firms, namely tournament theory and behavior theory. The result indicates as follows：all kinds of firms are suitable to apply tournament theory to design their incentive policies of executive pay; competitive executive pay structure has a positive effect on the improvement of performance, while equal pay structure goes against firm＇s value creation; tournament theory is more appropriate for state-owned enterprises or large firms or high-growth firms to design executive pay structure than for private enterprises or small firms or low-growth firms. Therefore,it is inappropriate for China＇s state-owned enterprises which are not in finance and insurance industry to implement excessive equal executive pay, otherwise it would destroy firm＇s performance and value creation.