内生时机选择下国有和外资银行的利率竞争

结合中国银行业的背景,本文建立了国有和外资银行以利率为决策变量的 Bertrand 和 Stackelberg 混合寡占模型,并以内生时机选择为思路,前瞻性地探讨了国有和外资银行的竞争格局和时机选择问题.研究发现:(1)在一定参数范围内,国有银行较外资银行有更低的存款利率.在国有化程度较小时,Bertrand下的国有银行利润大于其作为领导者的利润;(2)在国有银行做领导者的利率竞争中,国有和外资银行存款利率会随着国有化程度及二者存款收益的增加而上升;(3)在私有化程度很高且二者存款收益相等时,利率竞争扩展博弈的SPNE是国有银行领先,外资银行跟随.

Toward Competition between State-owned and Foreign Banks under Endogenous Timing

Based on the scenario of Chinese banking industry,we establishes Bertrand and Stackelberg mixed oligopoly competition models with interest rates as strategic variables between state-owned and foreign banks.More importantly,considering the endogenous timing setup and taking the extended game with observable delay as the basic model,we analyze the competition results and timing choices of the two banks at different market structures.It shows that(1) within some parametric range,the stated-owned bank has lower interest rate cost than that of the foreign bank;and the state-owned bank get higher profit in Bertrand competition than that in the Stackelberg leadership when the degree of nationalization is no more than 0.25;(2) in the Stackelberg competition with stated-owned bank as the leader,the equilibrium interest rate of both state-owned and foreign banks will rise with the degree of nationalization and the deposit return rate of state-owned and foreign banks;(3)when privatization degree reaches over 3/4 and both banks have the same deposit return rate,the SPNE of interest rate extended game is(L,E),i.e.the state-owned bank will lead and the foreign bank will follow.